Your AI coding tools — Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, Copilot, and more — now route through Unbound. We see every prompt, every terminal command, and every MCP tool call your agents make, and we enforce your policies inline, before anything runs. Nothing changes for your developers. Everything changes for your security team. This playbook walks you through what’s in the platform, what each part is for, and how to get value fast.Documentation Index
Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.getunbound.ai/llms.txt
Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.
1. Getting started (5 minutes)
Sign in
Go to your Unbound gateway at gateway.getunbound.ai — or your organization’s custom tenant domain, if you have one.
Connect your first tool
Open Connect → AI Coding Tools, pick your tool, and follow the one-line setup. For Claude Code and Codex, choose Subscription mode — keep your existing Claude / OpenAI subscription while Unbound observes and enforces via hooks.
2. The dashboard — your home base
Your landing page is an at-a-glance health view of your whole org: devices and tools connected, agentic activity (terminal commands and MCP calls), how many actions were blocked / warned / allowed, total spend, and recommendations. It’s built to be skimmed — start here each day, then click into whatever needs attention.3. See what your AI tools are actually doing
Before you write a single policy, get visibility. Open AI Tools Discovery → Summary. This is your mission control: it inventories every AI tool detected across your org and flags risk. Three things to check on day one:Shadow AI tools
Unsanctioned AI tools developers installed on their own. Review the list and decide what’s approved.
Unconfigured Full-Auto users
Developers running with auto-accept and no deny rules and sandboxing off — the highest-risk setups. The Permissions sub-page shows exactly who.
Unverified MCP servers
MCP servers whose publisher is unofficial or unknown. The MCP Servers sub-page flags each one so you can spot shadow MCP.
4. Tool Policies — guardrails on what AI can do
Tool Policies govern the actions AI agents take — the terminal commands they run and the MCP tools they call — and stop the dangerous ones before they execute. Find them under Policies → Tool Policies.What each action does
| Action | Stops the operation? | Logged? | What your developer sees |
|---|---|---|---|
| Audit | No | Yes | Nothing — it runs normally and you get a log entry |
| Warn | No | Yes | A warning, then it proceeds |
| Block | Yes | Yes | An error explaining the block |
| Require Slack Approval | Pauses | Yes | A Slack DM to approve or deny; the agent retries after the decision (needs the Slack integration) |
Three ways to create a policy
- Guided form (UI). Open Policies → Tool Policies and click Create Policy, then choose Terminal Commands or MCP Actions. Build the rule with dropdowns: When (command family) → If (field to match + pattern) → Then (action) → optionally scope to User Groups. A live preview shows the rule in plain English as you build it.
- Describe it in plain English. The create dialog has a “Describe a policy or paste a command…” box. Type what you want — e.g. “Block any database command that drops or truncates” — and Unbound fills in the form.
-
Ask your AI agent (CLI). Any developer onboarded with the Unbound CLI can ask their agent (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex) to create the policy. The agent runs the
unboundCLI for you. Requires the CLI installed and logged in with an Admin role.
Command families you can target (terminal commands)
Unbound classifies every command an agent runs into a family, grouped by area:| Area | Families |
|---|---|
| System | Update System File, Environment Setup, Package Management, Build Operation |
| Filesystem | Read File, Write File, Delete File |
| Process | Process Management, Execute Script, Update Cron |
| Network | Remote Access, Data Transfer, Remote Execution, Container Operation |
| Cloud | Cloud Read, Cloud Provision, Cloud Destroy, Cloud IAM, Cloud Secrets, Cloud Config |
| Security | Access Password, Privilege Escalation, Environment Exposure |
| Git | Git Action |
| Database | Database Read, Database Write, Database Admin |
Worked example A — Stop AI from destroying production infrastructure
The real risk: AI coding agents increasingly run with cloud and database credentials. One misfired command —terraform destroy, kubectl delete namespace production, aws rds delete-db-instance, DROP DATABASE prod — can wipe an environment in seconds. Layer the four actions by severity:
- Block what is never legitimate — Command Family Database Admin, Match Against Operation, Pattern
DROP*(add a rule forTRUNCATE*); and Command Family Cloud Destroy, Match Against Environment, Pattern*prod*. - Require Slack Approval for destructive actions that are sometimes valid, so a human signs off in-channel first — Command Family Cloud Destroy, Match Against Environment, Pattern
*staging*. - Warn on risky-but-common actions so the developer gets a heads-up without being blocked — Command Family Git Action, Match Against Operation, Pattern
push --force*. - Audit first when you don’t yet know what’s normal — Command Family Cloud Destroy, Match Against Any — log everything, tighten later.
terraform destroy against production is blocked; against staging it’s held for Slack approval; a routine terraform plan runs as usual.
Worked example B — Gate destructive MCP actions across your tools
The real risk: an AI agent wired to the GitHub, Linear, or Sentry MCP can delete a repository, wipe issues and comments, or remove a Sentry project — irreversibly, in a single tool call, with no terminal command to catch it. Control them by action type:- Block the never-automate actions — MCP Server GitHub, action type destructive.
- Require Slack Approval for destructive actions you occasionally need — MCP Server Linear, action type destructive (covers
delete_comment,delete_attachment,delete_status_update). - Audit to learn which MCP tools your agents actually reach for before you enforce — any server, action type destructive.
delete_comment) instead of a whole action type.
Test it: deleting a GitHub repository is blocked; deleting a Linear comment is held for Slack approval.
Recommended starting policies
| Policy | Family / Server | Action | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|---|
| Block destructive DB ops | Database Admin (DROP*, TRUNCATE*) | Block | AI should never drop or wipe a database |
| Block production cloud teardown | Cloud Destroy (environment = *prod*) | Block | One command can delete a live environment |
| Approve staging teardown | Cloud Destroy (environment = *staging*) | Require Slack Approval | Sometimes valid — keep a human in the loop |
| Warn on force-push | Git Action (operation = push --force*) | Warn | Force-push can overwrite shared history |
| Block deletes in protected paths | Delete File (path = */prod/*) | Block | Deleting critical files is destructive |
| Gate destructive MCP calls | Any server, action type destructive | Require Slack Approval | Human approval for irreversible MCP actions |
5. Guardrails — content inspection
Where Tool Policies govern what AI agents do, Guardrails (under Policies → Security Policies) inspect the content of requests and responses. They act inline — on a request before it reaches the model, and on a response before it reaches your developer:- PII Detection — emails, phone numbers, and other personal data.
- Secrets Detection — API keys, passwords, tokens.
- Actions: Redact (mask the sensitive value before the model sees it), Block, or Audit.
6. Where to find things
| You’re looking for | Go to |
|---|---|
| Every request / prompt through the gateway | Logs |
| Terminal commands AI executed (family, risk, policy match) | Analytics → Tool Use → Terminal Run |
| MCP tool calls AI made | Analytics → Tool Use → MCP Actions |
| Guardrail activity (redactions, blocks) | Analytics → Data Security |
7. Settings you should know (admins)
Under Settings:- Integrations — connect Slack (required for the Require Slack Approval action).
- Policy Enforcement — choose what happens if Unbound is ever unreachable: Allow (operations run as usual — the default) or Block (operations are denied). Pick based on your risk tolerance.
- Users & User Groups — invite teammates, assign roles (Admin / Member), and create groups to scope policies to specific teams.
8. (Optional) LLM Gateway features
If your organization uses Unbound as its LLM gateway (routing model traffic through us), you’ll also see Models, Model Policies, Cost Policies, Cost Management, and Billing. These let you control which models are allowed, cap spend per user or team, and manage invoices. If you only use Unbound to govern AI coding tools, you can skip this section — these pages won’t appear in your nav.9. Troubleshooting
- Policy not firing? Confirm it’s Active and scoped to the right user group (empty = everyone).
- MCP policy not matching? Check the exact MCP server name on the MCP Servers page.
- Command classified differently than you expected? Open the command in Analytics → Tool Use → Terminal Run — the family and risk score are shown on every entry.
- “Require Slack Approval” not prompting? Connect Slack under Settings → Integrations.
Questions? Reach us in Slack or email support@unboundsecurity.ai.

